First off the Mosquito could not carry a bomb load anywhere near that of a B-17.
Second, it could only go faster than contemporary Spitfires at extremely low altitudes, and all Spitfires except for the Mk. XVI were some of the slowest low altitude fighters of the entire war.
But yes, it was a very good bomber, and didn't do war crimes like the B-17 and Lancaster did.
Sorry, but better to cite if you are going to argue; It was FAST. Speeds in excess of 400 mph are fighter speeds. By comparison, the B-17 had a top speed of 287 and that was probably only on its way home. (The pilots didn't like having up-armored B-17s because while they had a lot of firepower and armor, they were as slow going back as going out since they had no payload to jettison.) Prototypes in 1941 and 42 were already exceeding 420 mph but that is usually with a stripped down plane, not one fit for combat. It is, nevertheless, fast.
It could carry a significant payload. It was a night fighter and an anti-ship platform. It had range and accuracy as well as low radar cross section. It was everything in a 2-engine plane the Germans wished they had and were never able to produce (see the me-210 for example).
FYI - your last sentence implies a particular bias.
From Janes (De havilland B Mosquito):
Performance
Maximum speed: 361 kn (415 mph (668 km/h)) at 28,000 ft (8,500 m)
Range: 1,300 nmi (1,500 mi (2,400 km)) with full weapons load
Service ceiling: 37,000 ft (11,000 m)
Rate of climb: 2,850 ft/min (14.5 m/s)
Wing loading: 39.9 lb/ft2 (195 kg/m2)
Power/mass: 0.189 hp/lb (311 W/kg)
Armament
Bombs: 4,000 pounds (1,800 kg)
B-17 Payload (B-17G):
Bombs:
Short range missions (<400 mi): 8,000 lb (3,600 kg)
Long range missions (≈800 mi): 4,500 lb (2,000 kg)
Overload: 17,600 lb (7,800 kg)
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How does this keep coming up?
Here is a list of always-brought-up "what if"s that couldn't have happened even "if":
- Winning Battle of Britain: Germany greatly underestimated the RAF fighting capacity going into this. Also the British were were on an emergency war footing, and building more fighters than they lost (and building planes at a rate twice that of the Germans at the same time).
- Operation Sea Lion: To say this could work takes a fundamental misunderstanding of the complexity (even by modern military standards) of amphibious landings. The British and the Americans had been studying this for generations and even the under funded US militaries had been putting serious effort in both funding and excersizes in working out this specialty of warfare. They were to amphibious landing what the German operational artists were to land warfare in 1939.
The Germans would have to land on contested beaches without special equipment or training, without air superiority (let alone supremacy) and with a Surface navy that was both in numbers and training the inferior of the defensive naval forces. (and that is just the very simple explanation.)
- Taking Gibraltar without Franco's support (see Operation Sea Lion above, or the attempts on Malta, which was closer to Italy and farther from the deep blue water of the Atlantic that favored the Royal Navy).
- Capturing Moscow by attacking earlier, by focusing only on Moscow, etc. It wasn't the winter that stopped the Germans. Full stop. It was Russian resistance and ability to rebuild its forces while the Germans lacked resupply and reinforcements. It wasn't like they got to Moscow and then spent their effort. It was that the forces that made it TO Moscows defenses was a spent force. They didn't break through the outskirts of Moscow let alone through the suburbs let alone into or around Moscow. Moscow was ten times the size of Stalingrad.
- UK surrendering. The moment Churchill became the leader this became as likely of happening as Stalin surrendering (in other words it wouldn't happen).
- Keeping the US out of the War. This also wasn't going to happen. While there might have been a strong neutrality sentiment in the US before the war that was rpidly eroding in the favor of going to war. The reason it didn't take any time to declare war on Germany by the end of '41 is because sentiment was already moving that way.
The list is much longer (Me-262, Panzers, etc. etc.) |
Well Lenin signed one but your probably right and I suspect Hitler wouldn't have settled for anything but total annihilation either. It think it would depend on whether not signing would result in the end of Stalin perhaps from a coup or break-up of the remainder of the union when they saw the central power diminished (i.e. Crimea, Ukraine, Caucasus split and Siberia turn into Fiefdoms like before the Reds conquered them all). Probably happy to sacrifice millions for the cause but the leadership themselves not so much
Lenin's signature was fulfilling his promise to the Germans who pretty much made the overthrow of the Tsar possible. He signed a peace that basically gave him Russia. |
The big problem for the Germans that you are ignoring robertmikael is the resistance. (It often forgotten in these threads.)
The Germans couldn't advance further than they did even with good weather. They never managed to advance in the south, since their units had been fighting fierce battles with incredibly stubborn Soviet resistance and now came upon a strongly defended city.
They managed to advance in the north, taking a bridgehead across the Moskva-Volga canal, they weren't driven back by cold but by fierce counterattacks.
Attacks directed from the immediate west was again pushed back by Soviet counteroffensives after the attacking Germans had been seriously weakened by heavy soviet defenses. Not to mention the very fierce fighting that had been going on already since September.
The logistics that AvNY points out makes sure the Germans never was able to replace the losses they took. The Rasputitsia slowed the German advances and made logistics harder but in the end they never were able to end Soviet resistance and recover the losses they took fighting towards Moscow.
For the Germans to be able to advance more quickly you need to solve the problem of being able to replace losses much quicker, especially in terms of armored vehicles, ammunition and fuel.
And in order to fix that problem you have to fix the problem of logistics. Even before the rasputitsia set in the logistical situation was very dire. The distances are simply too great and the losses are too heavy. And most importantly the resistance is constant and it is heavy, some suggest it just got worse the closer they got to Moscow.
Then of course we could discuss the notion that the Stalinist regime would ever sign any kind of peace treaty anyhow. I find it highly implausible. Such an agreement would just mean a complete destruction of the Communist experiment and the top brass not having much options but suicide. I doubt they would do that in Yaroslav, perhaps in Kamchatka.
I am not sure he gets the ideas of TO&Es, supply or the how the rates of consumption of fuel and ammunition differ so greatly during defense, maneuver (and advance) and the beginnings of an offensive.
Just because units labeled "Corps" "Army" or "Army Group" are in a certain position doesn't mean that the strength or potential of those labels are the same at any given time. While the AGC facing Moscow was not exactly Force Steiner of the Battle of Berlin, it was still a shadow of what it was on June 22nd and greatly diminished from its strength when Typhoon started. And that is after a several week period of resupply once the rasputitsia ended with the coming of winter. Remember, initially the coming of winter was WELCOMED by the Germans. It froze the mud that both held up their advance and their resupply.
If you start Typhoon a month earlier because Barbarossa started a month earlier, Russian reinforcements continue at the same pace but you are now facing the forces around Moscow in the beginning of October, with the Rasputitsa about to cut off a supply chain that is also 400 km longer than it was at Smolensk while the Russians you are facing are sitting int he midst of the best infrastructure in the Soviet Union.
The usual argument is that the Germans could have won had they started earlier, but I am beginning to think that an earlier start to Barbarossa would have meant a faster defeat of the Germans in the war. |
Known by WW2 aficionados but not by a lot of others, one of the best planes of the war, the DeHavilland Mosquito, was designed to be built by furniture makers.
Metal was in short supply, but there was a huge cottage industry of skilled furniture makers in England, and DeHavilland had already been designing "wooden" planes for a while. So they melded the excess available skill and the need for a new plane.
It had long range and the same payload capacity as a B-17, flew faster than a Spitfire, could be armed with MGs, cannons, and eventually night-fighter radar. Due to little metal had a very low radar signature. And some 8000 of them were built.
Lots of documentaries about it on Youtube. |
" for as long as video games have been around"?! Less than 40 years since Pong.
On the other hand chess has been around forever. So why does white always get to move first?! Buff black! |
I have never been an armchair general and will never be. I try to understand things, therefore I ask questions. You have said all this in another words earlier, but not given proofs or answered my questions that I have asked earlier (of course you can still answer them).
I try in an another way. B.H. Liddell Hart writes (History of the Second World War 1970, page 168): "So the push for Moscow was resumed on November 15, when there was a momentary improvement in the weather. But after two weeks' struggle in mud and snow, it was brought to a halt twenty miles short of Moscow."
Let say the weather had been much better, and all the 2 weeks struggle had been in extremely good weather, could they have reached further? The fact is that they struggled for 2 weeks and used fuel and other resources, as they could have done if the weather would have been better. Or does the supply line end somewhere where the advancing could not reach further, where and why?
Supply lines (whether military or business, etc.) are complicated things. Things have to happen according to plan. not only do the supplies have to be in the right place and time so does the fuel, parts, equipment personnel, etc. Kinks in the supply line can have huge implications to the efficiency.
Just one example is the rail net in Russia. A lot has been made about the difference in gauge. But that limits the scope of the problem. First of all the lines were single tracks and there was only one to each major Russian center being attacked (North, Center and South). One track, even assuming 100% efficiency, is not a lot of capacity with which to supply a whole army group.
But the gauge was different. And it isn't the gauge itself that is the problem, that is actually fairly easy to change (since German gauge is narrower the railbed, the part that takes the most effort, is still completely usable, just undo the ties and move them closer). But this implies the need to use German rolling stock, not Russian rolling stock.
But that leads to two more problems. first, there just wasn't enough German rolling stock. Second, that rolling stock was ill suited for Russian tracks. You see the Russians worked with trains that held more water and coal than German trains, and hence their water and coaling stations were much farther apart than those in the more densely populated Western Europe. So you have to relay the tracks, build new coaling stations, and still are left with only one track and insufficient rolling stock. Until the coaling/watering stations are built you essentially can't use the tracks.
The alternate plan is also less than ideal. The use of Russian rolling stock. But this implies 1) that the Russians cooperate by leaving this intact. and 2) it imposes further inefficiencies because once you reach the end of the German rail you have to unload everything and reload it onto Russian rail. This is not insumountable but if you didn't plan for it (and the Russians didn't cooperate by leaving you rolling stock) you are still delayed until those pieces are put in place.
But you had best prepare for one of those plans or you just aren't planning for an offensive all the way to Moscow.
I'll add that you have to get the supplies form the railhead to the troops, implying distances upwards of 100 miles in some cases, and the Germans just didn't have enough trucks for this.
All of these problem exist before you take into account the fact that you have to do it all in the presence of large partisan forces who want to create as many problems for you as they can. |
Every choice has a downside and we don't see most when we look back with our 20/20 hindsight. The Germans could not have Panzer divisions closer to the one possible beachhead without having them farther from another. And even those closer to Caen would be too far from Omaha to have made any difference (by mid-day the battle of Omaha was decided even if not over). Besides, they would have to travel not just 10s of extra miles but across the axis of 2-3 beachheads, and through the Bocage, to do it.
Had they engaged sooner the invasion would still have worked. Casualties on the allied side would have been greater but so would have those on the German side. Except this time it would have been casualties of front line Panzer divisions that would later be used effectively in defense rather than 2nd and 3rd rate infantry divisions.
Much of the allied plan revolved around blocking those Panzer divisions. It was why the 21st Panzer division fared so poorly.
German guns were just not going to be a counter to the naval ships. The allies had cruisers and battleships, ships designed to resist hits by 8, 10, 12" guns, and there were a LOT of them. 7 battleships (12-16" guns), 5 heavy cruisers and 17 light cruisers plus hundreds of destroyers.
I should add that reach the beach between beaches on the first day is not the same as reaching the beaches where the landings take place.
using the same 20/20 hindsight the ultimate success of Overlord was never at risk. |
Yes I agree but if those forces had already been close as Rommel wished the supplies would have been up with them close.
Imagine a scenario where Rommel got his way and had more divisions close and they acted swiftly on the day arriving in greater numbers during the morning or midday when infantry was the only thing really ashore in any depth (and then only 2-3 miles) - I don't think much heavy equipment would have got off the beach until perhaps naval fire had dealt sufficient attrition and if they Germans could bring up fresh artillery (and use the stuff they had once the paras had been snuffed out) to shell the beaches (and ships) in that time it would have been a disaster . The allies nearly abandoned Omaha due to getting stuck - I think they would have had to pull back and come back another day somewhere else - once they had re-planned the whole thing of course
Every choice has a downside and we don't see most when we look back with our 20/20 hindsight. The Germans could not have Panzer divisions closer to the one possible beachhead without having them farther from another. And even those closer to Caen would be too far from Omaha to have made any difference (by mid-day the battle of Omaha was decided even if not over). Besides, they would have to travel not just 10s of extra miles but across the axis of 2-3 beachheads, and through the Bocage, to do it.
Had they engaged sooner the invasion would still have worked. Casualties on the allied side would have been greater but so would have those on the German side. Except this time it would have been casualties of front line Panzer divisions that would later be used effectively in defense rather than 2nd and 3rd rate infantry divisions.
Much of the allied plan revolved around blocking those Panzer divisions. It was why the 21st Panzer division fared so poorly.
German guns were just not going to be a counter to the naval ships. The allies had cruisers and battleships, ships designed to resist hits by 8, 10, 12" guns, and there were a LOT of them. 7 battleships (12-16" guns), 5 heavy cruisers and 17 light cruisers plus hundreds of destroyers. |
Ok, we have discussed also this earlier. I say, if the Germans had advanced 100km further, they would have surrounded Moscow and cut off the city from the rest of the Sovjet Union, and by that action they would had bring the city into starvation.
You don't give proofs for your claims, you only say that they were at the end of their supply line. But I ask again: How would that 50-100km matter dramatically? Or where exactly did the German supply line reach a point that they can't advance further, and why?
Again you are being an armchair general. To attack units need to be at high levels of supply and readiness. The consumption of fuel and ammunition while on the attack are orders of magnitude greater than what is necessary for defense. A unit at 70-80% of its strength but at 20-30% of it's ammunition and fuel reserves is in no shape to attack. But that would be optimistic compared to what we know of the forces that reached Moscow. Panzer divisions at the end of Typhoon were at 25% tank strength. The artillery was down to 10% of the supply needed for the missions asked of it. Fuel for even those few vehicles left was in short (to no) supply. |